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Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria Revisited
by Jim Y. Jin
*
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria with mixed products, linear
demand and cost functions. It is found that a firm's price (output) need not be
higher (lower) in Cournot equilibrium. However, given any number of firms and a
mixture of complement and substitute products, every firm's price margin/output
ratio is always higher in Cournot equilibrium, and the weighted squared outputs
(price margins) are higher (lower) in Bertrand equilibrium. When price (quantity)
competition is a supermodular game, consumer surplus (social welfare) is higher in
price competition. Nevertheless, price competition results in more market
concentration measured by Herfindahl index.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Ein erneuter Vergleich von Cournot- und Bertrand-Gleichgewichten
In diesem Beitrag werden Cournot- und Bertrand-Gleichgewichte für den Fall des Pro-
duktemix, linearer Nachfrage- und Kostenfunktionen verglichen. Als Ergebnis kann fest-
gestellt werden, daß der Preis (Output) eines Unternehmens im Cournot-Gleichgewicht
nicht höher (niedriger) sein muß. Angenommen, es gibt eine beliebige Zahl von Unter-
nehmen und ein Produktemix von Komplementär- und Substitutionsgütern, dann ist der
Quotient aus Preisspanne/Output immer höher im Cournot-Gleichgewicht und die
gewichteten Quadrate der Outputs (Preisspannen) sind höher (niedriger) im Bertrand-
Gleichgewicht. Wenn Preis-(Mengen)-Wettbewerb als supermodulares Spiel betrachtet
wird, dann ist der Konsumentenüberschuß (soziale Wohlfahrt) im Falle des Preiswett-
bewerbs höher. Trotzdem führt Preiswettbewerb zur höherer Marktkonzentration,
gemessen am Herfindahl-Index.
                                               
*  I thank H.Albach, R. Amir, C. Matraves, H. Röller, M. Tröge, especially X. Vives and
K. Okuguchi for their comments. The responsibility for remaining errors is solely mine.1. Introduction
Since Bertrand's famous criticism on Cournot's homogeneous duopoly model,
there has been a widely held conjecture, if not a belief, that price competition
results in lower prices and higher outputs than does quantity competition. A
comparison of these two benchmark oligopoly models has been widely
undertaken in the literature. Examples include Hathaway and Rickard (1979) who
examined a duopoly market with general demand and cost functions. They found
that at least one firm's price is higher in Cournot equilibrium than in Bertrand
equilibrium. Under duopoly Singh and Vives (1984) further showed that both
firms' prices are higher and outputs are lower in quantity competition than in price
competition, if each firm can make a profit when the other's price or output is
zero. Cheng (1985), obtained similar results with a geometric approach.
Extending the analysis to a general oligopoly model, Vives (1985) and Okuguchi
(1987) obtained a nice conclusion that under certain conditions, prices are lower
in Bertrand equilibrium.
These papers significantly improved our understanding of the two models.
However, some questions remain unanswered. First, are prices (outputs) always
lower (higher) in price competition? Okuguchi (1987) gave a counter example in
which prices (outputs) are higher (lower) in Bertrand equilibrium than in Cournot
equilibrium. However, his demand function xi = 1 - pi - 3pj, i, j = 1, 2, can not be
generated from a concave utility function. It has not been known whether this can
happen if the demand function is derived from a concave utility function. We will
show that even if demand is linear and derived from a concave utility function,
marginal costs are constant, a firm's price need not be higher in Cournot
equilibrium when goods are complements, and output need not be lower when
goods are substitutes. Then if both complement and substitute goods exist, neither1
a price must be higher nor an output must be lower in Cournot equilibrium. We
actually can say little whether price competition is more competitive.
Secondly, as a Bertrand equilibrium does not necessarily imply lower prices or
higher outputs with a mixture of complement and substitute products, is there any
other criterion by which it is viewed more competitive than a Cournot
equilibrium? In fact, most previous papers did not allow mixed products1, though
the opposite is often true in the reality. This paper shows that when demand and
cost functions are linear, the ratio of price margin to output and the weighted sum
of squared price margins or output can be used as such criterion.
The third question: what is the fundamental force which makes price competition
more competitive than quantity competition? One may think substitute goods as
an essential factor. This explanation seems very consistent with Bertrand's
original argument and could be easily accepted by economists2. However, Singh
and Vives (1984) found that in duopoly "quantities are lower and prices higher in
Cournot than in Bertrand competition, regardless of whether the goods are
substitutes or complements" (pp. 549). It suggests that the substitutability is not
essential. This paper examines the crucial importance of the concavity of utility
function. Additional to that, the supermodularity can ensure a partial ordering in
prices or outputs with non-linear demand and cost functions. When quantity
(price) competition is supermodular, social welfare (consumer surplus) is higher
in price competition. However, price competition results in a higher market
concentration measured by Herfindale index.
                                           
1The exception is Okuguchi's model (1987) where products can be divided into two groups,
substitutable within groups and complementary between two groups.
2For example, in a seemingly type error, Cheng wrote: "Cournot equilibrium prices (quantities) are
higher than Bertrand equilibrium prices (quantities) . . . if the goods are substitutes
(complements)"  (1985, pp. 146)2
The next section introduces the linear oligopoly model. Section 3 gives examples
that some firm's price (output) can be lower (higher) in Cournot equilibrium.
Section 4 presents two criterion by which price competition can be said more
competitive than quantity competition. Section 5 discusses supermodular games
and Herfindale index. The last section concludes and considers future research.
2. Linear model
There are n firms. Each firm produces one product. Firm i's output is denoted by
xi and its price by pi. The product vector is denoted by x and the price vector by
p. Every firm i has a constant marginal cost ci. Denote the nu1 cost vector by c.
Firm i chooses its price pi or output xi to maximize its profit xi(pi-ci).
The representative consumer has a quadratic and strictly concave utility function
u(x) = ax - 0.5xBx, where a is an nu1 positive vector and B is a symmetric nun
matrix. Since u(x) is strictly concave, B is positive definite. The consumer
chooses a consumption bundle x to maximize her surplus u(x) - px given p. Since
u(x) is strictly concave in x, a vector x satisfying the first order condition a - Bx -
p = 0 is indeed optimal. This gives us the inverse demand function in quantity
competition:
p(x) = a - Bx (1)
Since B is positive definite, 
wpi
wxi
 < 0 because it is the ith diagonal element of -B.




the output and price vector in Cournot equilibrium by xC and pC.
Rearranging (1) we obtain the demand function in price competition:
  x(p) = B-1(a-p) (2)3
Since B is positive definite, B-1 exists and is positive definite. 
wxi
wpi
 < 0 because it
equals the ith diagonal element of -B-1. Let D be the diagonal matrix whose ith
diagonal element is di  { -
wxi
wpi
. Denote the output and price vector in Bertrand
equilibrium by xB and pB.
In quantity competition, firm i chooses xi to maximize its profit xi(pi-ci) where pi
is given by (1). In Cournot equilibrium the first order condition holds for every xi,
i.e. pi - ci - Oixi = 0 for all i, or pC = c + /xC. This condition and (1) together imply
a - BxC = c + /xC. Notice that B + / is positive definite and its inverse (B+/)-1
exists. We can solve the Cournot equilibrium output as
xC = (B+/)-1(a-c) (3)
Given a vector a - c, (3) gives a unique solution. Let I be an identity matrix.
Substituting (3) into pC = c + /xC, we get the unique Cournot equilibrium price as
pC = (I+B/-1)-1(a-c) + c (4)
In price competition, each firm i chooses pi to maximize its profit xi(pi-ci) given
the demand function (2). In Bertrand equilibrium every firm i's price satisfies the
first order condition xi - di(pi-ci) = 0. Thus we have xB = D(pB-c). This condition
and (2) imply B-1(a-pB) = D(pB-c). Notice that B-1 + D is positive definite and its
inverse (B-1+D)-1 exists. We can solve the Bertrand equilibrium price vector pB =
(B-1+D)-1(B-1a+Dc). Again, it is unique. We can write it as
pB = (I+BD)-1(a-c) + c (5)
Substituting (5) into xB = D(pB-c), we solve the unique Bertrand equilibrium
output vector:
xB = (B+D-1)-1(a-c) (6)
To make the equilibrium comparison meaningful, assume that every firm is active
in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria, i.e. xC > 0 and xB > 0. Given (3) and (6)4
we need (B+/)-1(a-c) > 0 and (B+D-1)-1(a-c) > 0. Then (4) and (5) imply pC > c
and pB > c. All firms make positive profits. Given these conditions next we show
that pC t pB and xB t xC may not hold.
3. Examples
Singh and Vives (1984) considered a linear duopoly model. The consumer utility
function can be written as a1x1 + a2x2 - 0.5(b1x² 1+2rx1x2+b2x² 2), where ai and bi are
positive. Additionally, b1b2 > r², so the utility is strictly concave. Also, it is
assumed that aibj - ajr > 0 for i z j. So the demand function in price competition
has a positive intercept. It implies that a firm's demand is positive when both
prices are zero. Under these conditions, they found the difference between a firm's
Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium outputs, xB
i - xC
i = (aibj-ajr)r²/(b1b2-r²)(4b1b2-r²),
and the difference between prices, pC
i - pB
i = air²/(4b1b2-r²). Hence they conclude
that "Quantities are lower and prices are higher in Cournot than in Bertrand
competition" (pp. 549).
Their proof clearly shows that aibj - ajr > 0 is essential for the comparison. If one
allows firms to have positive and different marginal costs, equivalently ai must be
replaced by ai - ci as pointed by Singh and Vives. Then xB
i > xC
i requires (ai-ci)bj -
(aj-cj)r > 0. This means that firm i is able to sell some products when both firms
charge prices equal to their marginal costs. This condition is stronger than to
assume positive equilibrium outputs in both quantity and price competition. For
example, let ai = bi = 1, r = 0.8, c1 = 0.3 and c2 = 0. Thus, (a1-c1)b2 = 0.7 < (a2-c2)r
= 0.8. In fact, in this case the demand function is pi = 1 - xi - 0.8xj in quantity
competition and xi = (0.2-pi+0.8pi)/0.36 in price competition. One can check that
xC
1 = 5/28 > xB
1 = (5/28)u(19/27). Firm 1's output is larger in Cournot equilibrium.5
When goods are substitutes, firms can make positive profits only if ai > ci for i = 1
and 2. Given b1b2 > r², (a1-c1)b2 < (a2-c2)r and (a1-c1)b2 < (a2-c2)r can not hold
simultaneously. So we can not have both firms' outputs higher in quantity
competition.
Therefore, for a linear duopoly with a symmetric demand function but different
marginal costs, outputs need not be higher in price competition unless we require
that every firm has a positive demand when prices are set at marginal costs. The
requirement simply means x(c) > 0 in our linear oligopoly model. The result of
Singh and Vives clearly showed that this requirement is sufficient in a duopoly
case given other standard assumptions. Then, a natural question is whether it
holds true in oligopoly. More precisely, the question is: if x(c) > 0, xC > 0 and xB
> 0, whether we have xB t xC with n > 2.
Let us consider a three firm case. Assume a strictly concave utility function x1 +
x2 + x3 - 0.5(x² 1+x² 2+x² 3) - 0.8(x1x2+x1x3+x2x3). This implies firm i's inverse
demand function in quantity competition pi = 1 - xi - 0.8¦
jzi
3
xj and its demand
function in price competition xi = (1-9pi+4¦
jzi
3
pj)/2.6. Further assume c1 = 0.1, and
c2 = c3 = 0. Clearly the condition x(c) > 0 is satisfied. One can check that xC > 0
and xB > 0 also hold. Nevertheless, we have xC
1 = 23/108 > xB
1 = 567/2860. Firm 1's
output is lower in price competition. With more than two firms, the condition x(c)
> 0 is not enough to ensure xB t xC.
We need to explain why the situation changes from duopoly to oligopoly.
Consider an n firm case with a symmetric B, whose diagonal elements are 1 and
the off-diagonals are r > 0. Goods are substitutes. B is positive definite only if r <
1. In our notation then, Oi = 1 and di = d = {1+(n-2)r}/(1-r){1+(n-1)r} for all i. In
this case xC > 0 and xB > 0 are guaranteed if B-1(a-c) = x(c) > 0. From (3) and (6)
we solve xB - xC =(d-1)(dB+I)-1(I+B-1)-1x(c). As d > 1, xB t xC requires T-1x(c) t 06
where T = dB + (d+1)I + B-1. The off-diagonal elements in dB and B-1 are equal
to rd and -r/(1-r){1+(n-1)r} respectively. Thus the off-diagonal elements of T are
equal to (n-2)r²/(1-r){1+(n-1)r} t 0. When n = 2, it is zero and T is a positive
diagonal matrix. xB t xC is guaranteed given x(c) > 0. When n > 2, however, the
off-diagonal elements of T become strictly positive since 0 < r < 1. This implies
negative off-diagonal elements in T-1. If xi(c) is significantly smaller than other
xj(c)'s, xB
i - xC
i will be negative. This is why the condition x(c) > 0 is not sufficient
to guarantee higher outputs in price competition.
Similarly, are prices always higher in Cournot equilibrium than in Bertrand
equilibrium? Singh and Vives (1984) showed that this is true in duopoly if and
only if ai > 0. In presence of positive marginal cost, ai should be replaced by ai - ci
and the condition becomes ai > ci. This means that firm i can sell it at a price no
less than its marginal cost when the other firm produces nothing. When goods are
substitutes, this is plausible. However, it may not be so with complement goods.
For instance, a car without gasoline is useless. A car may not be sold at its
marginal cost when gasoline is not available. Without the condition ai > ci, both
firms' Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium outputs can be still positive.
For instance, assume a demand function pi = 1 - xi + 0.8xj and marginal costs c1 =
1.2 and c2 = 0. Here firm 1's price is lower than its cost when firm 2's output is
zero. The demand function in price competition is xi = (1.8-pi-0.8pj)/0.36. We can
calculate equilibrium prices, pC
1 = 55.4/42 < pB
1 = 57/42. Firm 1's price is lower in
Cournot equilibrium. Even if we consider a linear duopoly with symmetric
demand, prices need not be lower in Bertrand equilibrium without the condition ai
> ci for i = 1 and 2.
Given a1 < c1, a2 must be larger than c2, otherwise firms can not sell any products
even with marginal cost pricing. Thus the price of the other firm must be higher
in Cournot equilibrium. This was shown by Hathaway and Rickard (1979).7
The next question is whether the condition ai > ci for all i guarantees higher prices
in Cournot equilibrium in oligopoly with n > 2. We consider a three firm
oligopoly with a symmetric and strictly concave utility function x1 + x2 + x3 -
0.5(x² 1+x² 2+x² 3) + 0.4(x1x2+x1x3+x2x3). The products are complements. The




in price competition xi = (7-3pi-2¦
jzi
3
pj)/1.4. Further assume c1 = 0.9, c2 = c3 = 0.
Clearly the conditions x(c) > 0 and a > c are satisfied. One can check that xC > 0
and xB > 0 hold. Nevertheless, we have pC
1 = 37/30 < pB
1 = 1.24. Firm 1 sets a
higher price in price competition than in quantity competition, even though ai > ci
holds for all i.
Now we look at why the situation changes from 2 firms to 3 firms. We again
assume the diagonal elements of B are 1, but let its off-diagonal elements to be
equal to r < 0. As B is positive definite, we have r > -1/(n-1). Now a > c ensures
x(c) > 0, xC > 0 and xB > 0. Given (4) and (5) we know pC > pB requires T-1(a-c) >
0, where T = dB + (d+1)I + B-1. As shown before, the off-diagonal element of T
is (n-2)r²/(1-r){1+(n-1)r}. If n > 2, it is strictly positive, so the off-diagonal
elements of T-1 are negative. We will have pC
1 < pB
1 if ai - ci is relatively small.
Therefore a > c is nor enough to ensure pC t pB with more than two firms.
We have shown that a firm's output can be lower in price competition when goods
are substitutes, and a price can be higher when goods are complements. Given
these results, one has to say that in general, when both complement and substitute
goods are allowed, neither prices are necessarily higher nor outputs necessarily
lower in Cournot equilibrium. The strong result, namely, pC t pB or xB t xC does
not hold even if demand is linear, derived from a concave utility function, and all
the conditions xC > 0, xB > 0, a > c and x(c) > 0 are satisfied. A question then8
arises: in oligopoly with mixed products can we retain any notion that a Bertrand
equilibrium is more competitive than a Cournot equilibrium?
4. Mixed products
Although we have found possible situations where prices could be lower and
outputs could be higher in price competition, the reverse probably remains true in
the most cases, including mixed products. However, the difficulty is: if one still
claims that price competition is more competitive, in which sense does he mean
that? In this section we will show that price competition is more competitive in
two restricted senses: in the terms of the equilibrium price margin/output ratio and
weighted sum of squared outputs and price margins. Although these criterion are
weaker than the individual comparison for every firm's price and output, it gives a
general idea about the overall competitiveness in price and quantity competition.
In certain extent we can still claim that overall price competition is more
competitive. Since we do not impose restrictions on product relations, we need to
constrain ourselves in a linear model for the tractability.
(3) - (6) reveal that the differences between two equilibria are due to two positive
diagonal matrices D-1 and /. Recall that Oi is the ith diagonal element of B, and di
is the ith diagonal element of B-1. We can prove (see Appendix A) that diOi t 1
and the equality holds only if good i is independent. The first order conditions in
firm i's output and price imply (pC
i-ci)/xC
i = Oi and (pB
i-ci)/xB
i = 1/di. As Oi > 1/di for




i for all firms. This gives us the following
Proposition 1: Every firm's price margin/output ratio is higher in Cournot
equilibrium than in Bertrand.
In general, a lower price margin/output ratio in Bertrand equilibrium does not




i  t x B




i. So Proposition 1
immediately implies
Corollary 1: No firm has a higher output and a lower price in Cournot equilibrium
than in Bertrand equilibrium.
The second criterion by which we can say that price competition is more
competitive is to compare weighted squared outputs and price margins. In
particular regarding the equilibrium outputs, we choose the fixed weights Oi - 1/di





i)²} > 0. Regarding the price margins,







Proposition 2: The sum of squared outputs (price margins) in Bertrand
equilibrium weighted by Oi - 1/di (di-1/Oi) is always higher (lower).
Obviously this result is not very strong because the specific weights. However,
there are certain advantages of these particular weights. First, in our linear model,
these weights are fixed and do not depend on a particular equilibrium outcome.
Second, the weighted sums are independent of the units of products. Since all




i for all i.
Thus Proposition 2 immediately implies
Corollary 2: At least one firm's price is higher and one firm's output is lower in
Cournot equilibrium than in Bertrand equilibrium.
As we can not claim a Bertrand equilibrium more competitive in terms of prices
and outputs, the two criterion above can be used as alternative measurements.
These criterion have some advantages as well as disadvantages comparing to
prices and outputs. Lower prices and higher outputs both indicate stronger
competition. Yet as we have shown, a firm's lower price does not necessarily10
mean a larger output, and vise versa. The ratio of price margin to output reflects
both prices and outputs. The weighted sum of squared outputs can be interpreted
as a weighted "average output", and the sum of squared prices as a weighted
"average price". This "average output" is always lower and the "average price"
higher in Cournot equilibrium.
We derived our result in a linear oligopoly model. Actually, linear demand is





  t 1. When the utility function is


































 t 1 is
guaranteed. Hence if every firm's sales is not more sensitive to its price, or its
price is not less sensitive to its output in Bertrand equilibrium than in Cournot
equilibrium, the previous results are valid for non-linear demand cases.
5. Supermodular game
In our linear model, when prices are strategic complements, i.e. 
w²xi
wpiwpj
 t 0 for all j 
z i, price competition is a supermodular game because 
w²Si
wpiwpj
 t 0 for j z i. If goods
are complements, i.e. 
w²ui
wxiwxj




 t 0 for j z i. When a game is supermodular, it is easier to compare the
equilibrium outcomes in price and quantity competition. In fact, when Vives
(1985) and Okuguchi (1987) showed that prices are higher in Cournot equilibrium
they both assume that price competition is supermodular. In this section we make
use of the results of supermodular games by Vives (1990) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) to compare Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium outputs. For the11
proof of their results we recommend reading the original papers, especially Vives
(1990).
As we did before, we assume that demand is derived from a strictly concave
utility function, but it need not be linear. Marginal costs are non-decreasing, but
not necessarily constant. To make our comparison meaningful, we assume both
quantity and price competition yield unique interior equilibrium solutions. In
addition to these, we assume 
w²Si
wxiwxj
 t 0 for all j z i, and Si is quasi-concave in xi.






= 0 where c' i(xB



























. The first term





 > 1, the second term is negative. So 
wSi
wxi
 < 0 in Bertrand
equilibrium. Every firm can raise its profit by lowering its output. As Si(x) is
quasi-concave in xi, given other firms' Bertrand equilibrium outputs xB
-i, every firm
i's optimal output is lower than the current level in Bertrand equilibrium, xB
i.
According to Vives' Theorem 5.1 (1990), there exists an equilibrium in quantities
with all outputs lower than those in Bertrand equilibrium. It is the Cournot
equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium outputs are lower in Cournot equilibrium when
quantity competition is a supermodular game. In a linear duopoly model, this
happens if goods are complements. In our earlier examples where one firm's output
is lower in Bertrand equilibrium, products must be substitutes.
Similar argument goes through when price competition is supermodular and profits
are quasi-concave in prices. The conclusion of Vives (1985) and Okuguchi (1987)








~ for all i by
Okuguchi and the assumption x(c) > 0 by Vives.12
When prices are lower, consumer surplus is obviously higher. When outputs are
higher, one can draw a definite conclusion in terms of social welfare even with
non-linear demand and cost functions. We can write the utility in Cournot
equilibrium as u(xC) = u(xB) + u'(xB)(xC-xB) + 0.5(xC-xB)u"(z)(xC-xB), and firm i's
cost ci(xC
i) = ci(xB
i) + c' i(xB
i)(xC
i-xB
i) + 0.5c" i(wi)(xC
i-xB
i)². Assume that marginal costs
are non-decreasing, so c" i(wi) t 0. Then the difference between the social welfare








i) is equal to





i)², where c'(xB) is
the vector of marginal costs in Bertrand equilibrium. Since the consumer
maximizes her surplus, u'(xB) = pB > c'(xB), the first term is negative if xB t xC.
The second is also negative due to the concavity of the utility function. The last
term is negative as marginal costs are non-decreasing. Thus the social welfare is
higher if outputs are higher.
Proposition 3: If price (quantity) competition is a supermodular game and every
firm's profit is quasi-concave in its price (output), prices (outputs) are higher
(lower) in Cournot equilibrium, and consumer surplus (social welfare) is lower.
Since xB t  xC and pC  t  pB do not imply each other, two criterion for a more
competitive outcome in price competition may not be consistent to each other.




xi, the Herfindale index is 100u¦
i=1
n
s² i. To calculate this index products must
be additive. Our model does not allow perfect substitutes, so we assume strong
substitute goods and let matrix B be symmetric. Without loss of generality, let the
diagonal elements of B be 1 and off-diagonal elements be r > 0.
Let G > 0 and consider an output vector x = (B+GI)-1(a-c). The diagonal elements
of (B+GI)-1 are {1+G+(n-2)r}/(1+G-r){1+G+(n-1)} and off-diagonal elements equal13






(ai-ci)/{1+G+(n-1)}. Let us denote





























(aj-cj)}²  t 0. The equality only holds
when n(ai-ci) = ¦
j=1
n
(aj-cj) for all i. This happens when all firms are symmetric,
namely ai - ci are the same. In this case Herfindale index equals 1/n in both price
and quantity competition. Otherwise L strictly increases in t. By its definition, t
decreases in G. Given (3) and (6), G is equal to 1/di in price competition and Oi in
quantity competition. Since diOi > 1, we know that G is smaller and t is bigger in




Herfindale index, price competition gives a higher index value than quantity
competition except for the case with symmetric firms.
Proposition 4: Price competition leads to higher market concentration measured
by the Herfindale index than does quantity competition.
Even when price competition leads to lower prices and larger outputs for all firms,
it results in a higher market concentration than quantity competition measured by
Herfindale index. This is due to the fact that given cost disparity price competition
results in more asymmetric outputs and market shares. Since Herfindale index
measures the concentration of market rather than the absolute prices or outputs, it
gives a lower mark for quantity competition. However, as we showed here, a
lower concentration does not always mean more competition. This result warns us
not mixing them two.
6. Concluding remarks14
It had been speculated that price competition leads to lower equilibrium prices
and higher outputs than does quantity competition. This paper showed that this is
not always true. When both complement and substitute goods exist, a firm could
produce less or set a higher price in Bertrand equilibrium than in Cournot even if
demand is linear, derived from a concave utility function and marginal costs are
constant. With more than three firms, this could happen even though every firm
can sell something at its marginal cost while other firms' prices equal to marginal
costs or quantities equal to zero. Hence, price competition is not always more
competitive in the terms of every firm's price and output.
Nevertheless, one can retain the original speculation in a restricted sense. If
demand and cost functions are linear, every firm's price margin/output ratio is
higher in Cournot equilibrium and a weighted sum of price margins (outputs) is
always higher (lower). This holds true regardless of whether goods are substitutes
or complements, or any mixture of them. The main driving force behind is the
concavity of utility function. In addition to that, if the price (quantity) game is
supermodular and profits are quasi-concave in firms' own decisions, consumer
surplus (social welfare) is higher in Bertrand equilibrium.
This paper probably raises more questions than it answers. For instance, it is yet
unknown whether one can apply the criterion of the price margin/output ratio and
the weighted sum of outputs/price margins to non-linear cases. Or, probably
better, one may find different criterion by which price competition is viewed
more competitive under general and intuitive conditions.
Secondly, except in the cases of supermodular games, comparison between price
and quantity competition was made in the terms of social welfare or consumer
surplus. It would be a meaningful measurement if an unambiguous result exists.
Besides our results in supermodular games, Vives (1985) has shown that in a
symmetric case both social welfare and consumer surplus are higher in price15
competition. So far we have not known any counter example. Thus this criterion
may preserve a general conclusion that price competition is more competitive.
Thirdly, as we have shown, Herfindale index is higher even though all prices may
be lower and outputs higher in price competition. It suggests a trade off between
efficiency and market concentration. If one takes into account of potential exit,
price competition would generally allow few firms than does quantity
competition. The a question arises: which situation is more competitive? It way be
worthwhile to find out a robust and meaningful criterion for that.
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Appendix A:
Denote the ith column of B without the ith element -
wpi
wxi
 by an (n-1)u1 vector bi,
and denote the ith column of B-1 without the ith element -
wxi
wpi
 by an (n-1)u1 vector
Ei. Let B-i denote the (n-1)u(n-1) sub-matrix of B without the ith row and ith16





+ Eibi = 1 and -
wxi
wpi
bi + B-iEi = 0. Multiplying the second equation by Ei, we get -
wxi
wpi
Eibi + EiB-iEi = 0. As B-i is positive definite, EiB-iEi t 0. So 
wxi
wpi
Eibi t 0. As 
wxi
wpi





 = 1 - Eibi t 1.









 (j z i) i.e. good i is independent of other products.  __
Appendix B:
Our output comparison means xB(/-D-1)xB - xC(/-D-1)xC > 0. (3) and (6) imply
that this equals (a-c){(B+D-1)-1(/-D-1)(B+D-1)-1-(B+/)-1(/-D-1)(B+/)-1}(a-c). It
is equal to xCTxC where T = (B+/)(B+D-1)-1(/-D-1)(B+D-1)-1(B+/) - / + D-1.
Notice that (B+/)(B+D-1)-1 = I + (/-D-1)(B+D-1)-1. T = 2(/-D-1)(B+D-1)-1(/-D-1)
+ (/-D-1)(B+D-1)-1(/-D-1)(B+D-1)-1(/-D-1), which is positive definite. Hence
xB(/-D-1)xB - xC(/-D-1)xC > 0.  
Similarly, for price margin comparison, we need to show that (pC-c)(D-/-1)(pC-c)
> (pB-c)(D-/-1)(pB-c). Given (4) and (5), it means (pB-c)T(pB-c) > 0, where T =
(I+DB)(I+/-1B)-1(D-/-1)(I+B/-1)-1(I+BD) - D + /-1. Since (I+DB)(I+/-1B)-1 = I
+ (D-/-1)(B-1+/-1)-1, the matrix T can be written as 2(D-/-1)(B-1+/-1)-1(D-/-1) +
(D-/-1)(B-1+/-1)-1(D-/-1)(B-1+/-1)-1(D-/-1). It is positive definite. Therefore we
get (pC-c)(D-/-1)(pC-c) > (pB-c)(D-/-1)(pB-c). __